We study 288 family firms included in the NSE CNX 500 index of the National Stock Exchange of India. We find an entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment relationship between family ownership and firm value. We show that family CEO has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between family ownership and firm value. When the interaction effect of Family CEO on family ownership is controlled, only family shareholding in the alignment range is found to be statistically significant. The study shows that family firms with family CEO suffer from a decrease in market valuation. This finding is extremely valuable given the fact that India is dominated by family firms and majority of family firms appoint a family member as CEO.
Introduction
Family firm is a prevalent phenomenon across many countries. Family owned and family controlled firms constitute around 90% of the firms in United States. (Poza, 2007) According to Claessens ' is yet to be answered concretely. This work tries to answer this question by evaluating the relationship between family ownership concentration and firm value by checking on the moderating effect of family CEO on this association.
We contribute to the existing literature at least in four ways. Most of the studies are carried out on data drawn from developed countries like United States and United Kingdom. These countries are typically characterised by widespread ownership. Developing countries have concentrated ownership. (Aguilera et al., 2011) A majority of top listed companies are family businesses. According to Sarkar (2012) , promoters control a majority of listed companies in India. Hence, there is a need to study the performance of family businesses in a market dominated by them. Institutional differences between the developed countries and developing countries affect the effectiveness of the large shareholders' monitoring efforts and in turn affect the firm performance. Developing counties are characterised by lack of pressure to ensure adequate disclosure by firms. Presence of political networks makes evasion of legal charter not very difficult. (Khanna &Palepu, 2000) Earlier works bring out the need for an institution context study of family firms to have more clarity on PA and PP agency conflicts. (Bhagat, McDevitt & McDevitt, 2011; Liu et al., 2012; Peng & Jiang, 2010) India has a less advanced capital market; a not so mature takeover market and a less developed managerial market.
Prospects for institutional activism in Indian companies are limited given their block holdings. (Sarkar, 2012 ) Their ability to act as counterbalancing force against promoters influence on Indian firms is constrained. This study fills in the gap in literature as it takes into account the institutional context of Indian firms. Impact of family involvement on firm performance suffers from gaps due to inconsistent results. (Filatotchev, Lien &Piesse, 2005) These inconsistencies may indicate that the relationship is more complex and involves variables that moderate or mediate this effect. We contribute to the literature by evaluating the relationship between firm ownership and firm value by accounting for the possible moderating effect of the presence of a family CEO in family firms with concentrated family ownership. Most of the studies that analyse ownership structure and firm performance carried out in India do not consider the endogeneity problem. (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2012) We test for the endogeneity issue using GMM technique. (Arellano and Bond, 1991) Besides, we concentrate on family firms which have the ability to influence the firm's managerial decisions, family firms with concentrated ownership levels or family leadership.
We find that family ownership has a nonlinear relationship with firm value. We show that family CEO has a negative moderating on the relationship between family ownership and firm value. We find that even firms in the alignment level of family shareholding suffer from this negative moderation effect. Family CEO has disproportionate power in case of family firms which is derived from her family connections. This could enhance the power of family firms with family CEO to expropriate the minority shareholders. We find that stock market disciplines the family firms with family CEO by discounting the value of such firms.
This rest of the study is organised in four sections. Section 1 presents the theoretical and empirical evidence on family ownership and firm performance. This section also presents the theory and the results of earlier studies that analyse the moderating effect of family CEO on the relationship between family ownership and firm value. Section 2 elaborates the methodology adopted.
Section 3 presents the results.
Section 4 provides the conclusions and implications of the study.
1
Family ownership and firm performance: theory and empirical evidence
We look at the association between firm value and family ownership and family CEO applying the agency theory.
Ownership concentration can restrict agency problem and improve firm performance. Efficient monitoring hypothesis suggests that ownership concentration motivates large shareholders to play an active role in monitoring management as they have both the incentive and ability. Large shareholders participate in corporate decisions and profit from their close monitoring efforts. (Grossman & Hart, 1986) Close monitoring of management may adopt a range of approaches from informal negotiations with management to formal proxy contests. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) Large shareholders may also pave way for third party takeovers by sharing the advantages of their holding with the bidder. Ownership concentration has the potential to evoke conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
Shareholders with high levels of ownership concentration have the ability to expropriate the minority shareholders. This is coined as the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis.
Large shareholders focus on their personal interests at the cost of minority shareholders of the firm. This is possible for the shareholders who have controlling interests on the firm through cross shareholdings, pyramidal structures of control even if they don't possess cash flow rights. Ownership concentration in the context of family firms is also studied in this paper. Family owners concentrate on long-run survival of the firm to enable wealth transfer to the subsequent generations. (Lee, 2006) This long term perspective of the family owners motivate them to adopt the most appropriate value maximizing criteria in investment evaluations that benefit the non-family minority shareholders as well. (James, 1999 In addition to the survival concern, family owners are equally anxious about the reputation. Reputation concern of family restricts the self-serving behaviour of managers. (Denis & Denis, 1994) Reputational concern of family firms can apply pressure on the self-serving behaviour of managers and also help maintain the long-term association with other stakeholders of the firm. However, the ability of the family owners with highly concentrated ownership may impact the firm value negatively.
Empirical works find both a positive (Carney &Gedajlovic, 2002) Firm-specific differences in ownership structure will result in varying effects on firm performance because of its impact on PA and PP conflicts. However, the presence of a family CEO may enhance or mitigate this agency problem. Ability of the family owners to impact firm performance through implementing value enhancing strategies or the ability to expropriate the non-family shareholders and work towards self-interest enhancing strategies depends on if the firm has a family CEO who can collaborate with the family owners. From PA and PP viewpoints, the impact of family ownership on firm value may be moderated by the presence of family CEO.
That family CEO could interact with family ownership is put forth by earlier works. (See for example Jiang and Peng, 2011) Jiang and Peng (2011) do not find any significant association between family ownership and firm performance. However, their extensive analysis brought out that the interactive effect of family CEO with family ownership moderates the relationship between family ownership and firm performance in case of Indonesia and Taiwan. They find a negative moderating effect in case of Hong Kong.
Our study analyses the impact of family ownership on firm value for firms with either high ownership concentration or family control that could impact the managerial decisions. Hence, we strongly believe that the presence of a family CEO in such a context could moderate the relationship between family ownership and firm value. Earlier studies that analyse the relationship between family ownership and firm value accounting for the possible moderating effect of family CEO on family ownership are extremely scanty. None of the earlier studies carried out in India focus on the family firms with concentrated ownership controlling for the interactive effect of family CEO. Hence, we analyse this aspect.
Methodology

Definition of family firm
Defining family firm should take into account the possible differences in the cash flow rights and control rights of owners due to pyramiding and crossholdings. Measuring insiders' shareholding based on cash flow rights alone could lead to wrong interpretations. Studies try to trace direct and indirect equity interest by means of equity chains. (See for example Lins, 2003) Indian data eliminates this problem. In India, shareholding disclosure by the listed firms is made as per the stipulation in Clause 40A of the Listing Agreement. Major block holders are classified into two major classes: promoters and non-promoters. Shareholdings by promoter groups include the holdings by promoters as well as by the persons acting in concert. Thus, promoter shareholding accounts for the holdings by the entities controlled by them. Definition of promoters' shareholding in India is grounded on the notion of control and not just on cash flow rights.
Family firms have different levels of family ownership and family control. Previous works have adopted different measures based on ownership and control for defining a family firm. We also define the family firm on the basis of ownership and control. As per the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 of India, a shareholder with a stake of 26% can influence the management of the firm by stalling special resolutions. Hence, in addition to considering the 51% required for a simple majority, we also include firms with 26% or more.
We define a family firm based on the following criteria. Firms that fulfil anyone of the following criteria from this list are included in the sample studied to arrive at the conclusions of this analysis.
1. Firms with median family shareholding equal to or above a simple majority of 51% which is sufficient to pass ordinary resolutions which cover most of business decisions.
2. Firms with a family CEO. 3. Firms with median family shareholding between 26% and 50.99% with a board that has one third of directors from the family.
Corporate governance regulations in India stipulate that if the board is led by a non-executive non-promoter chairman, at least one-third of the board should comprise of independent directors. We believe that if the board consists of equal number of promoter directors could influence board decisions.
4. Firms with median family shareholding between 26% and 50.99% with at least one family executive director on the board.
From now on, family firms in our study would mean family firms with concentrated family ownership high enough to influence the managerial decisions of the firm or family firms with family CEO.
Hypotheses
Based on the discussion in the previous section we derive the following hypotheses for our study.
1. Family ownership is a non-monotonic function of firm value. We expect the relationship to follow entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment pattern.
We expect the power of family owners to impact firm value is affected by the presence of a family CEO. However, the impact of the presence of a family CEO on family ownership will be a function of the level of family ownership concentration.
2. Family CEO will affect the relationship between ownership level and firm value. At the entrenchment levels of family ownership the presence of a family CEO could negatively affect the firm value while the impact could be positive at the alignment level.
Sample and variables definition
We study 288 firms. These are domestic private companies included in the NSE CNX 500 index belonging to non-financial services industry with data available on study variables during the study period, 2009-2014. The index covers stocks representing around 96.42% of free market capitalization of the listed stocks as of June 2014. The index represents top 500 companies listed on India's leading stock exchange. Data for the study is extracted from Prowess, database offered by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.
Sample firms belong to 17 industries. Industry classification of sample firms is given in table 1. We use a market based measure to analyse the impact of family ownership on firm value. We prefer the market based measure as it is the result of the consensus of a large number of independent investors on the firm value. It is likely to be better than any accounting measure affected by the accounting policies of the firm. Like some of the earlier works, we use market-to-book ratio as the measure of firm value. (Claessens et al., 2002) Market value is arrived at by adding the market value of common stock to the book value of debt and preferred stock.
The denominator of the ratio, book value, is the book value of assets.
Family ownership is measured as the fraction of total shares held by promoters.
Family CEO is a dummy variable. It takes the value of 1 if the firm has a family CEO, otherwise 0.
Board size is the number of directors on the board in logarithmic form.
Family executive directors on the board represented as a ratio to the board size.
Institutional shareholding is measured as the fraction of total shares held by institutional investors.
Firm size is the log of total assets. Debt is long-term debt divided by total assets. Age measures the number of years since the firm is incorporated and is included in logarithmic form.
Risk is measured by the systematic risk. Summary statistics for the sample firms are presented in table 2.
Results
We estimate the following model initially. 
The OLS regression brings out a cubic association between family ownership concentration and firm value. This suggests an 'entrenchmentalignment-entrenchment' relationship between these two variables. At a lower level of family ownership below 28.14%, and at a very high level of family ownership above 85.25%, we find a negative relationship between family ownership and firm value. Family ownership between 28.14% and 85.25%, family ownership has a positive relationship with firm value. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between family ownership and firm value. MTB = Market-to-Book ratio calculated as the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of debt and book value of preferred stock to book value of total assets FS = Family shareholding as the proportion of total shares FCEO = dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has the family CEO, otherwise 0 BRD = Natural logarithm of number of directors on the board FE = Family executives as the proportion of total number of directors on board ISH = Institutional shareholding as the proportion of total shares SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets DEBT = Total debt divided by total assets AGE = Firm age in logarithmic form RISK = Systematic risk of the firm Table 2 Additionally year dummies and industry dummies are included in the model, the results of which are not reported here for the sake of brevity. These studies find an increasing-decreasing-increasing relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Deb and Charuvedula (2004) show that insider ownership of 30% or less increases firm value. Insider ownership of 30% to 60% decreases firm value. Insider ownership above 60% increases firm value. Pant and Pattanayak (2007) find that ownership stake at less than 20% increases firm value. Ownership by insiders at 20% to 49% has a positive relationship with firm value. However, we find a decreasing-increasing-decreasing association between family ownership and firm value. The seemingly contradictory results are due to the ownership concentration levels of the family firms we study. Our sample consists of only family firms, firms that have a minimum family ownership stake of 51%, firms with 26% family ownership that have family executives or family members on the board or firms that have a family CEO if the family ownership is less than 26%. Our findings only relate to family firms with family ownership concentration or family control. Hence, our results differ from the results of the earlier studies which include all firms. Our finding that families that have high ownership decrease the firm value is in line with the suggestions made by They argue that families that have very high level of control on the firm could suffer from entrenchment and poor performance. We find that Family CEO has a negative association with firm value. Both the governance variables included in the model, board size and the family executives on the board, are found to be significant. Both the variables have a positive relationship with firm value. Larger the board size and higher the proportion of family executives on the board, higher is the firm value. Institutional shareholding positively affects the firm value. Firm size is not significant in explaining the firm value differences. Level of debt employed, firm risk and firm age are all found to have a negative impact on firm value. Since family ownership does not have a uniform impact on firm value at all levels, we further explore the sample to find out the distribution of the top family firms across different family ownership stake levels. Table 4 groups family ownership in terms of its impact on firm value. We find that about 91% of the family firms are in the alignment range and only around 9% of the family firms are in the entrenchment range. This shows that family ownership is helpful in value enhancement in a majority of the top Indian family firms. However, we find that around 91% of the firms in this range have a family member as the CEO. In fact, we find that firms across all the family ownership stake levels appoint family CEO. Around 66% of firm-year observations have a family CEO. Since, the basic model suggests that family CEO has a negative relationship with firm value, we would like to analyse if appointment of a family CEO by firms in the entrenchment level and in the alignment level have varying effects on firm value. We explore the moderation effect of family CEO on the relationship between family ownership and firm value.
We test the following model to analyse the moderation effect of family CEO on the relationship between family ownership and firm value. Table 2 We have centred the family ownership variables around their mean before testing for the interaction effect. Moderation analysis shows that family CEO moderates the relationship between family shareholding and firm value, in case the family stake is less than 85.25. Family CEO does not have interaction effect on family shareholding above 85.25%. If the family has a shareholding of less than 28.14%, the interactive effect of family CEO on family ownership is found to be negative. When the interactive effect of family CEO and family ownership is controlled, the family ownership is no longer significant. This implies that family firms that appoint a family member as CEO will see value diminish when the family shareholding is 28.14% or less. For family firms that appoint a non-family member CEO, there will be no association between family shareholding and firm value at this range. Family firms that have a family shareholding of 28.15% to 85.25%, also suffer from the negative interactive effect of family CEO on family ownership. For firms with a non-family CEO, we find a positive association between family ownership and firm value at this range. However, for firms with a family CEO, we find a negative interactive effect of family CEO impacting the relationship between family ownership and firm value. Family CEO does not moderate the relationship between family shareholding and firm value if the family shareholding is above 85.25%. However, if the interaction effect is controlled, we find that the family shareholding at this level no longer found to have a significant impact on firm value. Our finding that family CEO in a family firm can have a negative impact on firm value is also brought out by some of the earlier works. 
Endogeneity issue
All the results presented in the previous section assume that family ownership is exogenously determined. In case it is endogenously determined, the above models suffer from misspecification. Demsetz (1983) argues that the inconsistencies in the results of the empirical works that analyse the relationship between firm ownership and firm performance can be attributed to the fact that they do not control for the endogeneity of the independent variables and also for the endogeneity for the fixed effects. This can produce spurious results. According to Demsetz and Lehh (1985) 
The results are presented in table 6 . The results show that our analysis does not suffer from the problem of endogeneity. Results show that family ownership impact firm value while the opposite is not found to be significant. 
Conclusions and implications
We show that the nature of relationship between family ownership and firm value is affected by the level of family shareholding. Family ownership has entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment relationship with firm value. At lower levels of family shareholding of 28.14% or less and at higher levels of 85.25% and above, family ownership has a negative effect on firm value. Family shareholding in the range of 28.14% and 85.25% has a positive relationship with firm value. In the basic model, we find that appointment of a family CEO by family firms decreases the firm value. Governance variables studied, board size and the proportion of family executives on the board are found to enhance firm value. Debt, risk and firm age are found to have an inverse relationship with firm value. We find that family CEO moderates the relationship between family shareholding and firm value in case of firms with a family stake of less than 85.25%. The interactive effect of family CEO on the relationship between family ownership and firm value is found to be negative in both the cases. Relationship between family ownership and firm value is not moderated by family CEO if the family shareholding exceeds 85.25%. When the interaction effect is controlled, the family shareholding at the lower entrenchment level is no longer significant in explaining firm value differences. Though not statistically significant, the moderation effect at higher family shareholding in excess of 85.25% is also negative. When the interactive term is included the relationship between family shareholding exceeding 85.25% and firm value turns out to be statistically insignificant.
Our study offers important implications for the corporate governance of top Indian family firms. Appointment of a family member as CEO has a negative moderating impact on the relationship between family ownership and firm value at all levels. Family shareholding at lower levels of less than 28.14% and at higher levels exceeding 85.25% has no effect on firm value, when these firms do not have a family CEO. But, firms belonging to theses ranges of family shareholding suffer value decrease if they appoint family CEO. Most important finding is that the family firms with family shareholding ranging from 28.14% to 85.25% has a positive effect on firm value. We find around 91% of our top family firms studied fall into this category. However, these firms face value decrease in case they appoint a family CEO. In conclusion, Indian family firms suffer from value reduction when they appoint a family CEO. This finding assumes importance if viewed from the fact that family firms tend to appoint a family CEO when they have controlling shareholding rights. Around 67% of the firms in this category and across all categories of ownership level have a family CEO. Family firms appoint family CEO in order to avoid the possible agency conflicts that could arise in case of a non-family CEO controlling the decision making process. However, such a strategy will destroy value in case of Indian family firms. Probably Indian investors, see appointment of a family CEO as a wealth expropriation strategy by family firms irrespective of the family ownership stake in the firm. Family CEO gets power that is disproportionate to her shareholding. This power is derived from her family connection, due to her position as the head of the firm. This can help the family firms with family CEO to expropriate wealth from non-family shareholders. This gives rise to PP conflict in family firms. India has a weak institutional framework which is not very effective in regulating the family firms. Hence, stock market disciplines the family firms by discounting the market value of family firms with family CEO.
